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Abstract  
Dominant discourses on Muslim women have revolved around their marginal locations in commu-
nity as well as in society. It has mainly been subjected to socio-economic and political structures 
and conditions as well. However, it is worth mentioning that marginality is not only a lived experi-
ence but it also has metaphoric dimensions. The state of marginality relates not only to the poor 
socio-economic status of Muslim women but the politics of representation of their identities like 
veiled, passive as well as meek victims in various discourses also constructs the core of their mar-
ginal location in the larger society. Therefore, the marginalisation of Muslim women seems to be 
visible in various discourses in India. Briefly, the paper will attempt to comprehend the undercur-
rents functioning behind the construction of the very concept of marginality and locate Muslim 
women in popular and academic discourses on marginality.  
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Introduction 
The question of marginality is far from a novel 
topic. Moreover, locating the question of Mus-
lim women’s1 marginality in the popular devel-
opment discourse is not an easy task. The con-
cept of marginality is multidimensional. The 
Webster dictionary defines ‘marginal’ pertain-
ing to a margin situated on the border or edge. 
Marginality can also be defined in terms of so-
cial exclusion from a dominant social order and 
it forms an institutionalised system of material 
and symbolic exchange. However, marginality is 
best understood as state or series of situations 
between social exclusion and social integration 
(Lovell, 2004). Dominant discourses2 on Muslim 
women in India have attempted to define and 
locate their marginal location in terms of socio-
economic backwardness such as lack of educa-
tion, poverty, lack of employment opportuni-
ties and their invisibility in the labour force, etc. 
The Sachar Committee Report (2006) has high-
lighted the varied dimensions of marginality of 
Muslim community (Sachar, 2006). Muslim 
women as the member of the minority com-
munity suffer from all the symptoms of back-
wardness. However, the popular discourses 
rarely stereotype Muslim women as ‘less edu-
cated’ or ‘unemployed’ rather concentrates 
                                                 
1Muslim women in India should not be considered as a 
homogenous entity. Differences in their experiences are 
shaped by their location in class, region and family as 
well. Educational attainment and employment 
opportunities or lack of it, are also important indicators 
to mould their experiences. Therefore, the issue of 
heterogeneity needs to be mentioned. However, for the 
theoretical requirement I am addressing the equality 
question of Muslim women by considering them as a 
unitary category. 
2The category of discourse refers to historically specific 
systems of meaning which form the identities of subjects 
and objects. Meanings are always dependent upon a 
socially constructed system of rules and significant 
differences. The concept of discourse has also been 
extended to a wider range of social practices and 
phenomena. Michel Foucault has discussed about the 
ways discursive practices form the objects and subjects 
of discursive formations. Discourses are thus practices, 
which systematically form the objects, which we speak. It 
also raises questions about the historical construction of 
systems and the exclusion of human subjectivity and 
agency from the social world (Howarth, 2002). 
more on their ‘veiled’, ‘victim’ or ‘passive’ im-
ages.  
There is no denial of the established fact that 
the marginal location of Muslim women in the 
mainstream society has been integrally 
associated with overall socio-economic 
backwardness of the community and the 
policies of the derelict Indian state as well. 
However, in case of Muslim women, what 
needs to be argued is that the state of 
marginality not only constitutes the core of 
their lived experiences but the very state itself  
goes through a process of construction 
involving a wide range of factors and agents in 
power structures. It becomes possible by 
constructing a context with deliberation and 
purpose of creating one’s identity. Therefore, 
the marginal location of Muslim women in our 
society can also be viewed in the politics of 
representation of identities and knowledge 
production. For example, in dominant 
discourses, metaphors3 like talaq,4 hijab and 
burqa,5 fatwa have played quite significant 
roles to stereotype their identities as ‘passive’ 
‘fragile’, and so on. The politics of 
representation lies in the fact that it is not only 
Muslim women but women from other 
communities also lack access to education and 
employment and are subject to several 
challenges. Sarkar (2008) argues that Muslim 
women have already been established 
discursively as backward and hence incapable 
of progressive thinking. 
                                                 
3A metaphor is a figure of speech that describes a subject 
by asserting that it is, on some point of comparison, the 
same as another otherwise unrelated object. Metaphor 
is a type of analogy and is closely related to oth-
er rhetorical figures of speech that achieve their effects 
via association, comparison or resemblance.  
4 Triple talaq is a form of divorce, which can take place in 
one setting by pronouncing talaq for three times. This 
practice is a male monopoly. The holy Quran does not 
support this but it is a product of male-dominated 
society. 
5 Hijab and burqa are two different kinds of clothing that 
are available to Islamic women. A hijab or hejab actually 
refers to the rules of covering up. However, in the usual 
everyday context, the word is used to refer to a scarf, 
which covers the head. A burqa, on the other hand, is a 
loose outer garment that covers the whole body head-to-
toe. 
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It is also true that Muslim women’s subjugation 
cannot be understood without referring to the 
politics of intersectionality1 of gender, class and 
community identity. Rather than looking at 
sameness approach, it is better to recognise 
the politics of difference. It is also important to 
understand that Muslim women themselves do 
not constitute a homogenous group. Their lived 
experiences vary on grounds of class, 
educational attainment and regional location, 
etc. Muslim women like women from other 
communities, are under-represented in 
workforce as well as in politics and their 
educational attainment is also meagre. 
However, these issues are not solely 
responsible which attributes difference to their 
issues. Rather the prevalence of religious 
patriarchy as well as personal laws contributes 
largely to the issue of difference. It also shows 
that intersection of gender, class as well as 
community not only form their identity but also 
controls their embeddedness in social 
structures as well as in relations of power (Sur, 
2013).  
It is because of the fact that metaphors like 
talaq and burqa have been perceived in a 
negative sense, which signals the victimhood of 
Muslim women and reinforces their marginality 
in popular discourses. For example, observing 
purdah or burqa has closely been associated 
with cultural pressure but it may not always be 
oppressive in nature. The practice may be an 
expression of cultural identity and a choice too. 
In the same manner, the practice of triple talaq 
may be relevant for a particular section of the 
community but in reality, it stigmatises the 
entire community and projects the victimhood 
of Muslim women. The reference to the issue 
of declaring fatwas by religious leaders also 
portrays the community as conservative 
                                                 
1Intersectionality seemed ideally suited to the task of 
exploring how categories of class, community and gender 
are intertwined and mutually constitutive, giving 
centrality to questions like how community is ‘gendered’ 
and how gender is ‘class and community-based’, and 
how both are linked to the continuities and 
transformations of social structures and cultural 
discourses (Collins, 2000).   
 
especially for women, but the presence of a 
microscopic liberal progressive section within 
the community and their voices has hardly 
received attention in dominant discourses. This 
sort of representation of identities and bodies 
of knowledge on Muslim women and the 
community labels them as marginal and 
reproduces their victimhood in several 
discourses. Therefore, this entire process has 
ignited an enquiry to what extent the 
marginality question of Muslim women has 
been constructed by these dominant social 
forces.  
In this venture, rather than addressing the 
question of rights and gender justice, the essay 
will try to highlight the complexities inherent in 
the construction process of the marginality 
question of Muslim women in India. Hence, the 
argument of the essay is that gendered 
marginality not only results from socio-
economic and political policies and conditions, 
but it also exists in various discourses, 
representations and bodies of knowledge that 
are being constructed and generated about 
Muslim women in India. Therefore, the essay 
will try to locate various posts and discourses 
where the marginality questions of Muslim 
women have been constructed.  
Community and Marginalisation: On Politics of 
Representation 
Dominant discourses2 on Muslim community 
have represented them as homogenous 
community spelled with a capital C. It not only 
upholds the ideals of unity and common 
experience of marginality but has also 
generated stereotypes. For example, Hindu 
nationalists have always levelled the 
community as ‘terrorists’, ‘anti-nationals’, 
‘suspicious’ and Muslim males are labelled as 
‘husbands of four wives’ and many of these 
stereotyping are more political creations and as 
                                                 
2Dominant discourses also include discourse analysis. It 
incorporates a wide range of linguistic and non-linguistic 
material-speeches, reports, manifestos, historical events, 
interviews, policies, ideas, even organisations and 
institutions—as ‘texts’ or ‘writings’ that enable the 
subjects to experience the world of objects, words and 
practices. 
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far away from the reality as possible (Shaban, 
2012: 19). However, the overall impact of this 
on the Muslim community is grave. It affects 
their psyche and confidence to assert their 
rights (Shaban, 2012). This sort of 
representation overlooks the fact that Muslims 
are deeply divided on the lines of caste, class 
and gender. Even on ideological standpoints, 
community is divided. Moreover, this 
homogeneous representation seems to be 
problematic for Muslim women as well. On the 
one hand, the hegemonic representation of the 
community as ‘backward’ or ‘conservative’ 
tends to fix women’s identity in larger society; 
on the other hand, it also overlooks internal 
conflicts on the women’s question within the 
community. The conservative, progressive as 
well as fundamentalist groups within the 
community have conflicting standpoints on 
women’s rights in Islam. In India, the yardstick 
of defining an Islamic group or school as 
conservative depends not only on their 
unwillingness to accept western values but also 
on their rigid stand to accept women’s rights, 
already guaranteed within the Islamic 
framework. Moreover, fundamentalists are 
those who always dodge to change their 
standpoint on women’s rights.  Several schools 
like Jafari, Hanafi, Maliki, Safai’i, Hanbali 
support men’s right to triple talaq (talaq in one 
sitting), and polygamy as these are embedded 
in religion. Conservative interpretations also 
justify wife beating and impose several 
restrictions on women in the name of religion. 
Moreover, their perceptions and 
interpretations on women’s role in society are 
based on rigid demarcations between men and 
women. On the contrary, progressiveness of an 
Islamic group in India cannot be defined in 
terms of their inclination for western values; 
rather progressive groups uphold the gender- 
just nature of Islam, which gives them extra 
mileage to fight for women’s rights. 
Progressives like late Ashgar Ali Engineer have 
always argued that women’s rights are inherent 
in Islam but the patriarchal society has taken 
the rights away from women. Progressive 
groups have not only relentlessly challenged 
the conservative interpretations but also 
exhorted for reinterpretations of the Quranic 
verses. However, in reality, progressive voices 
hardly are represented in larger society 
because the progressive voices constitute a 
microscopic minority and they do not seem to 
be lucrative as vote banks for the Indian State. 
The conservative section of the community is 
more powerful in terms of its authority and the 
women question is mainly handled by the 
conservative sections within the community. It 
has also been argued that the discursive1 
representation of Muslim women as backward, 
victimised and silenced, and eventually invisible 
has undergirded the construction of other 
identity categories, and the politics of 
representation is based on difference among 
women rather than identity as crucial for 
understanding gender oppression and 
marginality. It also highlights the ways in which 
gender and racially defined community and 
class ideologies worked simultaneously to deny 
even middle-class Muslim women the limited 
visibility (Sarkar, 2008). Zoya Hasan and Ritu 
Menon have pointed out that recent 
interventions on Muslim women in postcolonial 
India are caught up in misconceptions that 
usually leave Muslim women invisible. Two sets 
of misunderstandings seem to plague 
discussions of Muslim women: the tendency to 
see Muslims, particularly Muslim women, as a 
monolithic category; and the overwhelming 
importance attached to Islam, especially the 
Muslim personal law in defining Muslim 
women’s status (Menon, 2004). The making of 
the category of Muslim in India has been 
typically influenced by popular discourses, 
which are characterised by attitudes prevalent 
in the larger social milieu about the 
conservatism and ingrained backwardness of 
the community. The marginal status of Muslim 
                                                 
1Discourse can be defined as entity, which is composed 
of sequences, signs and relations among objects, subjects 
and statements. It is the generation of the concept of the 
conversation within all modalities and contexts. It 
signifies the totality of codified language used in a given 
field of intellectual enquiry and of social practice. 
Therefore, discursive production means the production 
and prevalence of a particular knowledge by the 
dominant groups in society.  
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women has also been closely associated with 
stereotypes, entrenched by triple talaq, 
multiple marriages and purdah. Such 
stereotypes in both popular and academic 
domains are further reinforced by the 
systematic scholarship and information on the 
unequal access to resources and opportunities 
experienced by different groups of women in 
India today. It is also important to highlight that 
the stereotyped images of the Muslim 
community colour the understanding about the 
community and affect even the policies 
formulated for them. Stereotypes also cause 
discrimination in the labour market as well as 
public and private institutions (Shaban, 2012).   
Religion and Culture: Constructing Women’s 
Marginality through Knowledge Production  
Muslim community is considered the communi-
ty of interpretations. Being the minority com-
munity adds on a huge responsibility on their 
part to protect identity and culture, and wom-
en’s identity is not beyond the monopoly of 
community. Therefore, women’s role and sta-
tus cannot be comprehended through bypass-
ing the purview of religious and cultural dis-
courses. These are the sites, which have been 
reproducing and reinforcing their marginality 
within the community through interpretations 
of the Quranic verses, which ultimately result in 
knowledge production. This knowledge produc-
tion is not at all free from the dynamics of 
power. The essence of patriarchy and the inter-
ests of male-dominated society have always 
shaped women’s rights in society (Engineer, 
1999). Women’s rights in marriage, divorce, 
property in Islam have been interpreted by dif-
ferent schools like Hanibal, Malikh from differ-
ent angles. Asghar Ali Engineer said that Islam 
is an egalitarian religion but the interpretation 
of verses has subverted Muslim women’s rights 
(Engineer, 1994).  
The art of interpretation is not free from the 
influence of patriarchal society and culture. 
Certain verses relating to polygamy, triple 
talaq, veiling, and wife beating constitute the 
core of the Muslim personal law and not free 
from the politics of interpretations. It is im-
portant to take a holistic or ‘contextual’ ap-
proach to the analysis of women’s question in 
Muslim society. It is a way of clarifying the 
meaning of a text by interpreting it historically, 
and this method revolves around the text, the 
author and the context (E.McNabb, 2004). 
While discussing about the impact of Muslim 
personal laws on the lives of Muslim women, it 
can be illustrated by taking up the question of 
the polygamy and divorce. It has been said that 
Muslim men can have wives up to four (Engi-
neer, 2013). However, it is important to say 
that polygamy has been permitted by the 
Quran in a concrete social context in order to 
do justice to the weak and it is subjected to the 
condition that equality of treatment would be 
ensured. It is very clear from the wordings of 
the Prophet on polygamy that in order to en-
sure justice to the orphans, war-widows Mus-
lim men can have four wives (Ahmed, 2011). 
Another issue, which constitutes the core of 
Muslim personal law, is divorce or triple talaq. 
According to a precept of the Prophet, divorce 
is condemned as the most reprehensible of all 
things permitted. There is nothing more dis-
pleasing to God than divorce. The right to dis-
solve a marriage is given to the husband as well 
as to the wife. Women have to observe iddat1 
for three months to ascertain paternity. The 
Quran does not permit any outsider to separate 
a couple who want to live together even if one 
of them has a physical defect, though this can 
be a legitimate cause for divorce. The Quran 
emphasises that divorce should not be a hasty 
impulsive act but should be finalised only after 
a period of waiting during which time the cou-
ple is counseled and given a chance to rethink 
on the decision. Talaq is a procedure that can 
be initiated by the husband alone without the 
consent of his wife. Besides, the exercise of 
talaq is extra-judicial and in no way subject to 
external check. Technically, therefore, the 
power of the husband to divorce is absolute. 
                                                 
1Iddat has been defined as the waiting period for a 
widow or divorced. In Shariat terminology, it is the 
waiting period for a woman when her nikkah with a man 
is no more extant for one reason or the other; the 
waiting period means that after the cessation of nikkah 
the woman has to restrain herself for another nikkah till 
the prescribed period is over (Engineer, 1994). 
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Talaq may be pronounced in a number of ways, 
e.g., (1) ahsan (2) hasan (3) bid’ ah. 
The ahsan form of talaq is talaq-i-sunna. The 
repudiation does not take place at a single sit-
ting nor can it take place during menstruation. 
Iddat is observed during the period following 
menstruation that is tuhr or the purity period. 
Two arbitrators from both sides are appointed 
to bring about reconciliation. During the iddah 
period the marriage is not dissolved. If reconcil-
iation takes place, the marriage is saved and no 
nikkah is needed. In ahsan talaq, even after the 
third pronouncement of talaq, after the ‘iddah 
period, the marriage is revocable. The man can 
remarry his divorced wife. This practice is in 
accordance with the teaching of the Quran and 
according to Sunna Rules. Both Sunni and Shia1 
schools approve of talaq-a-ahsan. The hasan 
form is talaq-a-sunna but is not as commonly 
accepted as talaq-a-ahsan. The man is sup-
posed to pronounce talaq during the successive 
periods of purity or tuhr. A couple can live to-
gether as husband and wife if the husband so 
desires before he pronounces the third talaq. 
On the third talaq, the marriage is dissolved 
and the talaq is irrevocable. Therefore, he can-
not remarry her. If she wants to remarry, she 
has to perform halala, that is, marry another 
man, consummate the marriage, consequently 
dissolve it, and only then remarry her divorced 
husband. Prophets and Caliph Ali condemn this 
process of halala. All Shia and Sunni schools of 
thought have approved of talaq-a-hasan. Since 
it is not irrevocable, it is not very popular; yet, 
the Hanbali Sunni School gives it more im-
                                                 
1 Sunni and Shia Islam are the two major denominations 
of Islam. The demographic breakdown between the two 
denominations is difficult to assess and varies by source, 
but a good approximation is that greater than 75% of the 
world's Muslims are Sunni and 10–20% are Shia, with 
most Shias belonging to the twelve traditions and the 
rest divided between several other groups. Sunnis are a 
majority in most Muslim communities: in Southeast Asia, 
China, South Asia, Africa, and some of the Arab world. 
Shia community constitutes the majority of the citizen 
population in Iran, Iraq and Bahrain, as well as being a 
politically significant minority in Lebanon. Pakistan has 
the largest Sunni and second-largest Shia Muslim popula-
tion in the world (Engineer, 1994). 
 
 
portance than to other types of talaq. Talaq-a-
bidah is a form of divorce, which is severely 
criticised since it goes against the rules laid 
down by the Quran. However, the Sunna ap-
proves it. In this form of talaq, the husband uni-
laterally, without the consent or knowledge of 
the wife, pronounces talaq. Husband can pro-
nounce talaq once or three times simultane-
ously, without paying attention to the fact 
whether wife is in a state of tuhr. The Prophet 
did clearly not approve of this form of divorce 
(Baxamusa, 1994). 
Apart from this, women’s right to inheritance 
have also been violated in practice. As for 
property, movable or immovable, generally 
very few Muslim women work and earn. Islam 
does not prohibit them from working at all. The 
Quran allows her to earn. She has the right to 
own property in her own right. Thus, Islam rec-
ognises her individuality and her being as a le-
gal entity. In Islam, there is no concept that she 
has to confine herself to domestic duties alone. 
This clearly shows that bringing up children is 
not her responsibility alone but is a joint one. 
The husband is equally obliged to arrange for 
rearing children. However, in traditional socie-
ty, a man usually expects his wife to confine 
herself to domestic duties and disapproves of 
her working in order to earn. It is only in some 
enlightened families where she is allowed to 
work. Therefore, the way Islam ensures rights 
to women and the way it has been interpreted 
shows huge difference. It is quite clear that the 
status of women has deteriorated because the 
legal interpretations have always remained 
subject to patriarchal influences (Engineer, 
1995). Moreover, this art of interpretations has 
created the core of marginality from within. It is 
worth mentioning that Muslim women’s loca-
tion in minority community also shapes their 
experiences. Their minority community identity 
not only marginalises them within the commu-
nity but also makes their citizen identity as sec-
ondary. Even their access to the government 
institutions becomes restricted due to their 
community identity. Therefore, it is not easy to 
understand their marginality in terms of socio-
economic indicators rather power dynamics 
Sur. Space and Culture, India 2014, 1:3  Page | 49 
 
within the community constructs the marginali-
ty question of Muslim women in India. 
State and Political Leadership: Constructing 
Marginality and Muslim as ‘Other’  
Revisiting the marginal locations of Muslim 
women will remain incomplete without review-
ing the role of the political leadership and the 
state to construct the marginality of Muslim 
women as ‘other’. The Indian State has always 
represented its own claim on Muslim women’s 
marginality. Since independence, the Indian 
State has tried to protect the identity and cul-
ture of the minority groups by not intervening 
into their private domain, especially in personal 
laws. This is one of the reasons, which has giv-
en rise to the self-legislating Muslim communi-
ty where religious leaders had played a signifi-
cant role to define Muslim identity. The appli-
cation of the law is often a complex matter and 
the interpretation of the Sharia is the monopoly 
of Ulemas. Through these principal mecha-
nisms, Ulemas and Mullahs maintain control 
over Islamic society. Here the purpose is not to 
blame the State but to understand the puzzle 
for which women fail to access laws and justice 
and become marginal. This was visible in the 
case of 73-year-old Shah Bano (1986).1 While 
all other Indian women may claim the legal 
right to spousal support after divorce, Muslim 
women may not. While other women criminally 
prosecute their husbands for bigamy, Muslim 
women may not. According to the Sharia Act, a 
                                                 
1 According to Shariat Act (1937), Muslim women cannot 
demand lifelong maintenance after talaq. It is generally 
supported on the ground of minority community 
identity, religion and culture. In 1986, when Shah Bano 
went to the Supreme Court for demanding her lifelong 
maintenance, it gave rise to a clash between the 
collective rights of the community and individual rights 
and identity. The Supreme Court gave its verdict in 
favour of Shah Bano. However, Muslim fundamentalists 
protested this move vehemently on the ground that any 
change in Shariat Act by the state is against the identity 
of Muslim community. So the Shah Bano case (1986) 
shows that women’s claim to equal rights is treated as a 
betrayal to community, the culture and the religion. In 
addition, the Indian State very consciously 
institutionalises gender inequality in personal laws on 
the ground of minority identity and culture (Hasan, 
2000). 
divorced Muslim woman is entitled to a rea-
sonable and fair provision of maintenance with-
in the period of iddat; two years of mainte-
nance for her children; mehr and all the proper-
ties given to her by her relatives, friends’ hus-
band and husband’s relatives. If she does not 
get it at the time of divorce then she can apply 
to the Magistrate to direct her husband to fol-
low the order. In response to this, Shah Bano 
filed a case against her husband and the Su-
preme Court granted her appeal for lifelong 
maintenance from her husband. 
Nevertheless, this judgment was not a simple 
one and rather opened the floodgates of de-
bates and discussions on the tricky relationship 
between gender, community and the state. In 
response to the Shah Bano case and the subse-
quent legislation, Muslim community leaders 
split broadly into two camps. Conservative 
leaders considered the judgement as an attack 
to Muslim identity as well as Muslim personal 
law. Progressive leaders felt that the Supreme 
Court judgement was in accordance with the 
basic tenents of Islam and thus it was not an 
intrusion in Muslim personal law.  
Although they did not agree with everything 
the judgment said, they supported the substan-
tive conclusion: that Muslim man should pro-
vide adequate maintenance for destitute, di-
vorced women beyond the period of iddat. 
Constitutional scholar Granville Austin has ar-
gued that conservative opposition was not only 
imbued with ideological factors but economic 
and political factors. The judgement, if it stood, 
threatened not only the sacred text of Islam 
but economic interests of Muslim men who 
might otherwise be faced with maintenance 
payment to ex-wives. Additionally, the political 
interests of the conservative Muslim leadership 
were threatened as well. If personal laws were 
codified, the religious leaders would lose their 
power to interpret the Quran. To soothe ruffled 
feelings, the Rajiv Gandhi Government enacted 
the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on 
Divorce) Bill, 1986. This bill explicitly excluded 
Muslim women from the right to maintenance 
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available under the Code of Criminal Procedure 
(CrPC)1 (Hasan, 2000). 
The government’s response to this judgement 
was also very crucial as it rests on the need to 
provide protection of minority identity defined 
in religious and cultural terms. The government 
argued that it was against imposing a single 
pattern on all. It also argued in favour of differ-
entiated criteria of citizenship as against uni-
versalistic criteria. It is important to mention 
that differentiated citizenship is mainly con-
cerned with the inter-group equality, not with 
intra-group equality. That is why it leaves many 
structures of discrimination untouched. The 
government also asserted that the impetus for 
change must come from within the Muslim 
community. Therefore, the government cham-
pioned community rights, which gives priority 
to community’s self-defining and self-
determining character (Jayal, 2002). 
Indian state very deliberately never intervened 
in the private sphere of minority community. It 
is not only because of preserving their culture 
and identity but also for maintaining its own 
vote bank. It was quite clear in Shah Bano case 
(1986). The state could not guarantee the right 
to maintenance after divorce because the Mus-
lim fundamentalists perceived it as an intrusion 
into their culture and religion. Muslim religious 
leaders and ulemas issued a fatwa (proclama-
tion) that guaranteeing maintenance right was 
against the teachings of Islam. Within few 
months, the whole issue took the form of 
communal agitation claiming that Islam was in 
danger. Modern Indian State intervened in the 
religion of the majority community through 
Hindu Code Bill2 but it has never intervened in 
                                                 
1The Code of Criminal Procedure is the main legislation 
on procedure for administration of substantive criminal 
law in India. It was enacted in 1973 and came into force 
on 1 April 1974. It provides the machinery for the inves-
tigation of crime, apprehension of suspected criminals, 
collection of evidence, determination of guilt or inno-
cence of the accused person and the determination of 
punishment of the guilty. Additionally, it also deals with 
public nuisance, prevention of offences and maintenance 
of wife, child(ren) and parents (Hasan, 2000). 
2Following India's independence in 1947, the postcolonial 
government led by Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru 
completed the codification and reform of Hindu personal 
the religion of minority. There are two prob-
lems behind this issue. First, the Indian inter-
pretation of secularism based on which Indian 
State devised policies premises on a ‘principled 
distance’ between the government and reli-
gion. Second is the conflict between the claims 
of cultural communities and women’s rights of 
equal citizenship. The State never tried to re-
form Muslim personal law for guaranteeing cit-
izenship rights to all communities but the polit-
ical leadership realised that respecting religious 
sensibilities was more important.  
In postcolonial India, the role of the state to 
create minority identity is unavoidable. The 
State did this not only by maintaining a ‘princi-
pled distance’ from minorities but also by refus-
ing to intervene in the domain of personal law. 
The modern state has become the institution 
through which personal laws have to be nego-
tiated and gender has become the site on 
which they were negotiated. In the 1980s, the 
State had an important role in cementing a par-
ticular perception of the Muslim community as 
inherently conservative, resistant to reform and 
oppressive of women’s rights by accepting the 
conservative position on this issue. The pro-
gressive interpretation would have granted 
greater rights of maintenance to Indian Muslim 
women within the framework of Islam. In this 
case, the role of the State was critical in sanc-
tioning one set of views as representing the 
view of all, even the most Indian Muslims. In 
addition, far from protecting and enabling the 
                                                                               
law, a process started by the British. According to the 
British policy of non-interference, reform of personal law 
should have arisen from a demand from the Hindu com-
munity. This was not the case, as there was significant 
opposition from various Hindu politicians, organisations 
and devotees who saw themselves unjustly singled out as 
the sole religious community whose laws were to be re-
formed. However, the Nehru administration saw such 
codification as necessary in order to unify the Hindu 
community, which ideally would be a first step towards 
unifying the nation. They succeeded in passing four Hin-
du code bills in 1955–56: the Hindu Marriage Act, Hindu 
Succession Act, Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 
and Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act. These con-
tinue to be controversial to the present day among 
women's organisations, religious, and nationalist groups 
(Hasan, 2000).  
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dissident, vulnerable voices within the Muslim 
community, the state sanctioned and author-
ised the voices of and an androcentric interpre-
tation of the Muslim personal law of mainte-
nance. Instead of responding to the socio-
economic marginality of Muslim community, 
the state has constructed its own version of 
marginality for Muslim women.  
Not only the state, but also the role of women’s 
movement towards Muslim women’s issues like 
triple talaq, polygamy as well as burqa has re-
mained crucial in post-independence India. If 
the 1970s and 1980s were an age of explora-
tion, the 1990s was an age of doubt and reflec-
tion. The political polarisation over Mandal-
Masjid unsettled the discursive context within 
which questions of women’s rights and gender 
equality had been formulated. The evidence of 
upper-caste and middle-class women’s opposi-
tion to affirmative action for disadvantaged 
castes came as evidence of the caste-class fig-
ures among women and was a challenge to the 
political possibilities of a singular feminist gen-
der-speak (Banerjee et al., 2011).  After 1980s, 
the question of Muslim women’s identity and 
difference became very significant with the 
Shah Bano case. This is the case, which ulti-
mately resulted in the victory of Muslim per-
sonal law, and made the connection between 
women and religious personal laws very signifi-
cant. In fact, this case further escalated one of 
the major demands by women’s movement, 
that is, Uniform Civil Code to replace the reli-
gion-based personal laws, which govern issues 
of family, that is, marriage, divorce, property 
inheritance custody and guardianship of chil-
dren. The judgment was widely criticised by 
feminists, liberals as well as secularists on the 
simple ground that it violates women’s rights. 
Where Muslim religious leader found the 
judgment as an intrusion into their community 
as well as an attack to their identity, Muslim 
liberals, feminists and social reformers began 
campaigns all over India. They were in favour of 
upholding of section 1251 and demanded im-
                                                 
1  Under section 125 CrPC, every woman can claim to 
maintenance and it applies to all religions, castes and 
creeds. Maintenance can also be claimed under the 
respective personal laws of people following different 
provements in the legal rights of Muslim wom-
en against polygamy and to maintenance. Dur-
ing this time, the autonomous women’s groups 
came together to organise a demonstration, 
demanding that a uniform civil code must be 
framed.  
Conclusion  
The essay in conclusion highlights that the state 
of marginality is not only embedded in socio-
economic conditions but also in their represen-
tation of identities in several discourses and 
bodies of knowledge. It can be generated either 
by the state institutions or by the religious au-
thority of the community, which ultimately re-
sults in producing discourses on marginality of 
Muslim women. The dominant instrument of 
alienating Muslims from mainstream Indian so-
ciety and the majority community is through 
the construction of the ‘other’. This politics be-
hind the representation of ‘other’ constructs 
their identity, which ultimately affects the ‘eq-
uity’ issues. The discrimination in and exclusion 
from government-run welfare programmes for 
employment and political representation, in 
effect, has led to the collective alienation and 
deprivation of the community. This, at the end 
of the day, influences the status of Muslim 
women at socio-economic level as well as at 
various sites including discourses and bodies of 
knowledge. Therefore, it is important to men-
tion Muslim women’s marginality is not only 
socio-economic but also discursive and it can-
not be understood without the comprehending 
the politics of intersections of gender, religion, 
class and community in India.  Therefore, struc-
tures as well as discourses shape Muslim wom-
en’s experiences of marginality in our society.  
                                                                               
faiths and proceedings under such personal laws are civil 
in nature. The issue of maintenance became debatable in 
Shah Bano case (1986) in which the Supreme Court tried 
to uphold section 125 but the government could not 
materialise verdict of the court due to vociferous 
opposition from the minority community.  
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